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Abstract
This article focuses on the application of antidiscrimination regimes to
groups which have been discriminated-against de jure and de facto. This
Article approaches diverges from the dominant view that discrimination
is a purely destructive force. The central argument of the Article is that de
jure, overt and blatant discrimination necessarily contributes to the
creation of a coherent group identity recognized by law, which enables
groups that are discriminated against to obtain remedial relief. In contrast,
the law fails to recognize a coherent group identity for de facto
discriminated-against groups and thus these groups have to overcome a
structural

challenge

to

obtain

remedial

relief

to

counter

the

discrimination. Thus, strangely, groups that are discriminated against de
jure might be better off than groups that are discriminated against only de
facto once one considers both the discriminatory and the remedial phases.
After establishing the de jure/de facto distinction, the article explores the
effects of this distinction on the equal protection claims of discriminatedagainst groups by contrasting the experiences of African-Americans and
Mexican-Americans.
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“State power has made a significant difference
– sometimes between life and death –
in the efforts of Black people to transform their world” 1

Introduction
Imagine discrimination as an advantageous stratagem – unimaginable? Not
necessarily. This Article suggests that formal, overt and blatant discrimination in an
early, discriminating stage could be helpful by enabling a discriminated group to
establish itself, creating group recognition, and positioning the group as eligible for
antidiscrimination relief at a later, remedial stage.
Antidiscrimination laws are one of the most significant areas where the law
recognizes and seeks to redress suffering and injustice. They allow formerly
discriminated-against groups to utilize the legal system to redistribute social power
through variety of remedies. This Article approaches the prerequisite of
antidiscrimination laws that there be some past or on-going discrimination in a
manner that diverges from the dominant view that discrimination is a purely
destructive force. In contrast, this Article argues that discrimination can be a positive
force inasmuch as it provides legal recognition for a discriminated against group. In
other words, sometimes legal discrimination can make a group better off than it
otherwise would be by creating a group cohesiveness that the group can later use to
access powerful legal remedies against past wrongs.
The Article advances a novel argument re-evaluating discriminatory legal
rules as also having potentially important constructive, constitutive value for groups.
This notion does not mean that discrimination is good. Rather, the argument is that a
specific form of discrimination, namely de jure discrimination, not only negatively
influences the well-being of the group that is discriminated against, but also has
indirect positive effects on the well-being of the group later on by improving that
group's ability to access the legal system to fight against this discrimination. The
Article also suggests that in addition to influencing the well-being of the de jure
discriminated group, de jure discrimination also indirectly influences groups that
mainly suffer from another form of discrimination, namely de facto discrimination.

1

Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,1382 (1988).
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Groups in the latter category will often lack the ability to access the legal system that
groups in the former category generally has. Thus, strangely, groups that are
discriminated against de jure might be better off than groups that are discriminated
against only de facto once one considers both the discriminatory and the remedial
phases. The reason for this paradox is simple: it is easier to fight legal battles for
group remedy when a group has already been identified as the "outlawed" and is
asking to be “inlawed”. In doctrinal terms, this Article's argument is apparent in the
prerequisite of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence that one should be
discriminated against due to one’s membership in a recognizable, distinct group.
Groups that suffer from de facto discrimination, as opposed to de jure discrimination,
face structural barriers in fulfilling this requirement.
The hypothesis in this Article is that de jure discrimination has important
effects. De jure discrimination perpetuates the identity of the discriminated group, it
increases the sense of "realness" of the discrimination-based suffering, and it
vindicates the group's need for and entitlement to legal redress. To put in other terms,
although groups suffering from de jure discrimination were brutally excluded from
society by the law, they were, at the same time, included in society's primary legal
text, received "visibility" (albeit notorious visibility), and were constituted as a legal
entity (albeit as a discriminated-against entity).2 These effects become evident
through what this Article calls the "streaming from de jure discrimination paradigm,"
a phenomenon in which a group's struggle to become recognized by law as
discriminated-against is reinforced when that discrimination is de jure. In other
words, a group being de jure discriminated against at an early stage, which this
Article designates the "discriminating stage," dramatically increases that group's
prospects of recognition as a "legally discriminated group" that enjoys the right to
obtain antidiscrimination relief during the later, "curing stage".3 This understanding of
the interaction between de jure discrimination and legal relief demonstrates that the
2

In typifying “primary legal text” I exclude any non-regulatory official action and I include federal and
state constitutional provisions, state primary [primary] legislation, local-specific regulations etc. My
usage of this distinction as a version of the de jure / de facto distinction will be further elaborated
below.

3

The stage of commitment to the “antidiscrimination principle” begun gradually after the Civil War
and during the Reconstruction, but is much more evident, coherent, and holistic since the mid-20th
century. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976). Kimberle Crenshaw marks the abolishment of the Jim Crow legal
system as the crucial point of transition into the “formal equality” era. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377.
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past existence of de jure discrimination is a key factor in determining the quality and
quantity of the legal relief later available to the group and is a key factor in
determining how difficult it is for the group to obtain such relief. This Article
challenges the justness of the current "streaming from de jure discrimination
paradigm" and instead proposes an alternative approach that is more sensitive to
different modes of discrimination and thus more effective at fighting both substantive
and formal discrimination, whether that discrimination is de facto or de jure.
This Article's analysis is relevant to any regime in which at the first stage
dichotomous de jure and de facto discriminatory practices exist simultaneously and in
which at the second stage antidiscrimination laws are used to remedy past
discrimination.5 During the discrimination stage, all groups are subject to de facto
discrimination, while only some of them are also explicitly subject to de jure
discrimination. Although the theoretical application of the Article is more general, to
demonstrate its implications, the Article concentrates on a real world example,
contrasting American experiences of African- and Mexican Americans. The divergent
experiences of these groups represent the different remedial treatment available to
groups along the scale form de jure to de facto discrimination and help illustrate the
implications of this Article's approach.
African-Americans are the most prominent group to suffer from de jure
discrimination and represent the way in which "the streaming from de jure
discrimination paradigm" creates a legally cognizable discriminated-against group.
This group was the main target of America's de jure discrimination, both slavery and
the Jim Crow, state-sponsored, constitutionally protected system of racial
discrimination that took place after the abolition of slavery from 1890 through the
mid-twentieth century.6 Mexican-Americans, on the other hand, do not fit into the de
jure paradigm and demonstrate why the typical "streaming from de jure
discrimination paradigm" needs to be revised. Mexican-Americans are considered
America's "forgotten minority"; indeed, their status as a legally cognizable minority
group is fragile even in the present day.7 Mexican-Americans did not explicitly fall

5

My argument is limited to racial discrimination since it is the hardest category to identify and
determine, as opposed to gender-based groups or the group of the disabled, for example.

6

On the Jim Crow legal system of segregation see F. James Davis, Who is Black? 51-70 (1991). On
the constitutionality of slavery see Constitutional Law 422-431 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al., 4th ed., 2001).
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under any of America's de jure discriminatory regulations during the Jim Crow era,
despite the fact that Mexican-Americans were a substantial minority group at the
time.8 However, although they almost did not suffer from prominent or legally visible
de jure discrimination,9 Mexican-Americans did suffer from discriminatory practices
such as chronic abuse and segregation.10 This discrimination was quite similar in its
outcome to that suffered by groups suffering from de jure discrimination,11 except
that the discrimination against Mexican-Americans did not primarily occur through
the use of the formal, primary legal system. To date, despite being the largest minority
group in America today,12 Mexican-Americans remain largely invisible in the
American antidiscrimination discourse.13
The dominant position of African-Americans over Mexican Americans in the
antidiscrimination discourse has been widely discussed.14 This Article sheds new light
7

Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class under Rule 23
and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 Notre Dame Lawyer 393 (1975) (arguing though that a huge
change has occurred with Mexican-American identity); Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, Sonia R. Garcia,
Henry Flores & Jose Roberto Juarez Jr, Mexican Americans & the Law 16 (2004) [hereinafter:
Mexican Americans & the Law].
8
The survey was conducted in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the southern
states in which most Mexican-Americans resided. See Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Mexican
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 662, 680 (1975).
9
To be sure, I do not intend to state that there was no formal regulatory de jure discrimination against
Mexican-Americans whatsoever. However, this form of discrimination was sporadic and rare. See for
example a Californian regulation known as the “Greaser Act” from 1855, in which vagrancy was
banned on “all persons who are commonly known as ‘Greasers’ or the issue of Spanish…blood…” 113
Cal. Stat. 175 (1855) excerpted in Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1994)
(Undermines the “realness” of acknowledged races and arguing that races exist only as powerful social
phenomena) .For an exploration of the experience of Mexican-Americans under the legal system of the
United States from 1848 to 1946 see Martha Menchaca, Chicano Indianism: A Historical Account of
Racial Repression in the United States, 20 Am. Ethnologist 583 (1993). Menchaca’s historical review
reveals some differentiation between the American discriminatory treatment of Mexicans of Indian
descent and Mexicans of European-Spanish descent, in favor of the latter. Mexicans of Indian descent
were simply perceived as “Indians” rather than as “Mexicans”. Id, at 585-591.
10
For a brief history of Mexican-American encounters with the law see Mexican Americans & the Law,
supra note 7, at 4-10.
11

Greenfield & Kates, supra note 8, at 687.

12

U.S. Census figures identify Latinos as "the largest minority group in the U.S.” See Margaret E.
Montoya, A Brief History of Chicana/o School Segregation: One Rationale for Affirmative Action, 12
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 159, 162 (2000-01).
13

Eduardo Luna, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and
Discrimination Against Them Invisible, 14 La Raza L. Jour 225 (2003) (suggesting that MexicanAmericans have not suffered from discrimination or that they never resisted it).
14

See generally, Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1596 (1997) (determining a black
exceptionalism to other discriminated groups in America); Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and
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on this discussion and suggests that the difference between the two groups represents
also the different forms of discrimination suffered by them. Although one may
consider it fairly obvious that different types of discrimination lead to different
treatment in the discrimination discourse, this specific difference between the groups- where African-Americans have enjoyed genuine legal recognition as a
discriminated-against group, while Mexican-Americans have not--nonetheless
demands further inquiry.
Methodologically, this Article focuses on litigation over segregation,
primarily in education, as the way in which these different groups engage in the
discrimination discourse. It traces the various ways in which segregation litigation has
contributed to producing the legal recognition of groups that suffered de jure
segregation as opposed to the way it has shaped (or failed to shape) the legal
recognition of groups that suffered primarily from de facto segregation. The former
have come to be recognized as strong, cohesive groups, whereas the latter have
acquired at best fragile group recognition.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates the Article's analysis at the
juncture of the forms of discrimination and equal protection analyses as they relates to
other proximate analyses. Part II explores the advantages of de jure discrimination,
namely that it creates legally cognizable groups and thereby enhances the ability of
that group to obtain de jure relief. Part III describes the ways in which the current
rights discourse misses the process by which groups that suffer from de facto
discrimination seek to achieve de jure relief. The focus in this part is on the ways in
which American courts, dealing with segregation litigation in education, have failed
to apply antidiscrimination law paradigms to groups that have typically suffered from
de facto discrimination. Part IV argues for the greater use of contextual tools in
White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (1992) 16 (considers the Fourteenth Amendment and its
antidiscrimination jurisprudence as tailored to African-Americans’ experience). For a contrary position,
see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American
Racial Thought, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1219 (1997). Courts do not necessarily uphold the paradigm. See
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(suggesting that “…the Mexican-Americans residing in this district have experienced deprivations and
discriminations similar to those suffered by the district's Negroes, and they share with the Negro the
special problems involved in overcoming existing divisive conditions and the stigma and disadvantage
that have accompanied their segregation”). Other scholarship contends that the current socioeconomic
status of Mexican Americans is even worse than that of African-Americans. See Luna, supra note 13,
at 229. The 2000 United States Census reveals that Latinos currently comprise the largest minority
group and suffer from greater segregation than African-Americans. See Montoya, supra note 12, at
162. On the shared conceptual prejudice against both groups see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Critical Race Theory (2001) 76-74.
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applying antidiscrimination rules to de facto discrimination. Courts should be more
attentive to the full legal history of a group pleading discrimination and the lack de
jure discrimination against a group should not necessarily limit the legal recognition
that group should receive during the remedial stage. Part V concludes.
Part I: The Anti/Discrimination Discourse - Location, Location
This article’s argument is located at the intersection of discrimination and antidiscrimination theories and discourses and it challenges the traditional conception of
the ways in which they intersect. This part discusses the different ways in which the
theories and discourses intersect and how this Article's argument affects them.
1) The De jure – De facto Distinction discourse
What makes an act “de jure” and thus makes it eligible for judicial review? Is
a single, concrete decision by a low hierarchy official as de jure as an action is under
a federal statute? Over time, the distinction between de jure and de facto has been
progressively blurred, and sometimes this distinction signifies little more than a legal
conclusion. This ephemeral distinction has been criticized as having an elusive, false
jurisprudential effect, enabling court to draw a thin, changeable line between de facto
and de jure acts.15 Though fully aware of this criticism and supportive of it, this
Article still argues that at some level the distinction matters; specifically, the
distinction matters to the way in which groups discriminated against in different ways
perceive themselves politically and to the way in which those groups are perceived by
others. This Article employs the distinction consciously in its extreme technical sense
in order to make this theoretical point. Using the phrase de jure discrimination, I have
in mind a most materialistic, formal meaning, namely discrimination that is effected
by overt, explicit, and systematic laws and regulations. De facto actions of
discrimination, on the other hand, result from actions that are covert and that are less
or not formalized in primary legal texts. These two poles of discrimination,
nonetheless, are located along a continuum, in which the more resemblance the type
of discrimination being complained of bears to one of the poles, the more squarely the
argument made in this Article applies.

15

For a challenge of this distinction in order to demonstrate a de jure discrimination that allows for de
jure relief see Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala (Project Report), De Jure Segregation of Chicanos
in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rt-Civil Lib. L. Rev. 307 (1972) (challenging the denial of de jure
discriminated-against status for Chicanos in Texas).

9
The discussion of the role of the de jure/de facto distinction in the current
discrimination analysis has been somewhat meager and one-dimensional. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action, and thus
only counters de jure discrimination. This truth has profoundly limited courts' power
to confront non-de jure discriminatory actions. Since they occurred with little if any
legal record, de facto discriminatory practices were more difficult to track than de jure
discriminatory practices. Particularly in the struggle for desegregation in education,
artificial and blurred lines were drawn between largely similar discriminating acts by
public authorities.16 These arbitrary lines had a devastating effect on the struggle of de
facto discriminated against groups to overcome such discrimination.17 In many cases,
courts refused to provide relief for complaints made about segregating practices on
the grounds that those practices were not de jure and thus did not provide grounds for
judicial intervention.18
The traditional critique of the distinction between de jure and de facto
discrimination is different than the one this Article stresses. The traditional critique's
main goal is to facilitate a re-conceptualization of de jure acts to include acts that are
currently perceived as de facto ones with the eventual end goal of dismantling the
distinction.19 This Article, rather, stresses that the distinction, though largely
unjustified, has yet some meaningful effects that have been so far ignored in the
attempts to normatively abolish the distinction. The Article proposes a
phenomenological insight on the systematic effects that the divergent forms of
discrimination have in creating "legally cognized discriminated groups".

16

For this conception see the opinions of Justices Douglas and Powell in Keyes v. School District No.1
Denver, Colorado case, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The judges criticized this conception and clarified that
any discrimination administered by a state agency, regardless of its informal basis, as in the case of a
discriminatory unwritten policy and decisions by officials, is a state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Referring to the Board of Education's acts presented as "de facto discrimination," Justice
Douglas declared that "each is but another form of de jure discrimination" and suggests there should be
no constitutional implications to the distinction once the force of law is placed behind the defendants.
Id, at 216.
17
Id, at 218-19. Justice Powell suggested abandoning it in favor of adopting a broader conception of
constitutional justice. See Mexican Americans & the Law, supra note 7, at 27-28.
18
See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American
Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 555, 586-603 (1994) (presenting the various
petitions declined based on the de jure/de facto distinction).
19
See Cisneros, supra note 14, at 617-18 (reconceptualizating the facts as de jure acts). For a
comprehensive example of such a project, see Rangel & Alcala, supra note 15.
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2) The Judicial Protection of Minorities Discourse
The de jure/de facto distinction’s critique is significant to scholarship on the
justification for having judicial review that favors discriminated-against groups.20 In
his article on the judiciary’s legitimate role in protecting minority rights, Bruce
Ackerman used an interest-group analysis to reorient the doctrine of judicial
intervention in minority rights.21 Ackerman pointed out the misconceptions embedded
in the Supreme Court's standard "discrete and insular" definition for determining
which groups are entitled to judicial protection through the Equal Protection Clause.22
He specifically argues that the Court has failed to evaluate the real need for judicial
intervention on behalf of "anonymous and defused" minorities; Ackerman argues that
these groups need protection since they are typically less politically empowered than
the "discrete and insular" minorities. The argument here follows Ackerman's and, to
some extent, criticizes it as ignoring worsened groups in need for judiciary protection,
namely, minorities which are "anonymous, defused and legally absent".
Although Ackerman's argument focuses on the separation of powers and the
judiciary's power to nullify discriminatory statutes, it also suggests a broader,
enduring role for the judiciary with regard to protecting minorities.23 Ackerman's
analysis presupposes a viable legal recognition of the minority group, since he targets
the anti-democratic nature of the de jure discrimination from which that group suffers.
His basic idea is that the less politically effective a discriminated against group is, the
more courts are democratically empowered to operate to protect that group. In the
case of legally absent minorities, this political weakness is especially pronounced. For
example, these minorities lack the "visibility" necessary for the political system to
recognize their suffering or to enable them to accumulate political power. This Article
argues that these features are heavily influenced by whether a group is discriminated
against de jure or de facto, stressing the need for a reconsideration of how we define
what a minority group is for remedial purposes.
3) The Equal Protection Discourse
Recognition of a group is a prerequisite to that group asserting an Equal
Protection Claim by one of its members. But the group recognition this Article is
concerned with is not the commonly discussed nature of the group that is relevant to
20

Developments in the Law – Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1125 (1968-1969).
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985).
22
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
23
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 715.
21
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what level of judicial review applies to laws affecting that group.24 Rather, the
concept of group recognition in this Article is unconcerned with what level of judicial
review will apply, since a group’s desire to be classified as a “suspect category” to
receive the highest level of judicial protection is not a struggle to be recognized as a
group. For example, laws discriminating against women are subject to a lower level of
judicial scrutiny than African-Americans, yet women are the clearest legally
cognizable group.
The type of group recognition this Article is concerned with is the requirement
under the Equal Protection Clause that any group challenging a discriminatory act
would have enough distinctiveness so as to have standing to raise the discrimination
claim.25 This requirement under the Equal Protection Clause, although rarely
discussed, is crucial in pleading a constitutional violation: “the first step is to establish
that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied”.26 The Equal Protection Clause
thus incorporates a group-based ideology even while maintaining the individualistic
nature of claims.27 That is, one being part of a group--and the sameness one shares
with that group--is necessary as a foundation for any individual allegation of
discrimination. In this context, the lack of legal recognition as a group that is evident
in de facto discriminated against groups like Mexican-Americans means that these
groups have only a fragile, partial, and hesitant recognition. This limited recognition
means that in order to win an equal protection claim, the group identify must be
constantly and repetitively reassured before court. Thus, the effects of de jure
discrimination structurally limit the scope of equal protection that de facto
discriminated groups enjoy.

24

See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 685-692 (7th ed., 2004).
This prerequisite is different from the “standing doctrine” requisite embedded in Article III of the
Constitution. See Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, Questions 1507-1518 (Jesse H. Choper et al.,
9th ed., 2001).
26
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478479.
27
On the individualistic framework of the equal protection clause, see Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma
of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Responses to the "Crisis" Facing African- American Males,
23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 63, 71-87 (1994). On the role of the clause as protecting groups, see Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 123-127 (1976). However, this
Article’s argument does not rely on a communal perception of the Equal Protection Clause, since even
an individual claimant needs to prove membership in a group.
25
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Part II: Formal De Jure Discrimination and its Effects – A Phenomenology
Discriminated groups, as political categories, are created and recreated within
particular regimes of hegemony-power, and the language of law plays an important
role in this ongoing process. The de jure/de facto distinction is important to
understanding the way in which discriminated groups are constructed through the
legal text. The distinction affects a group's recognition in various ways through the
different stages of discrimination and the development of antidiscrimination law. The
difficulty, however, is that antidiscrimination law was initially based on the type of
redressed discrimination being de jure.28 Law is one important source from which
people draw their sense of reality and "realness." It is one of society's most reliable
mechanisms of producing reality or, as others sees it, of reflecting reality.29 It is the
place where social consensus and dominant beliefs are being realized. De jure
discrimination creates "differences" between groups, recognizes those differences,
and construes those differences as meaningful in reality. Therefore, the absence of
groups - or their "differences" - from society's legal texts might signify their nonexistence.
By asserting that legal texts matter, this Article embraces the basic idea of
social construction of reality theories in general and social construction of reality
through law, in particular. It treats primary legal texts as a major symbolic instrument
in the production and reproduction of power structures, and thereby calls for a
problematization of any alleged naturalness of the antidiscrimination discourse. The
effects presented below manifest the influence that de jure discrimination has on the
construction of a recognized discriminated-against group within the antidiscrimination
discourse. This phenomenon is distilled through the utilization of different methods
from various disciplines, such as the semiotics of law, the rhetorics of law and the
sociology of law. Additionally, the effects apply simultaneously to different players
and agents in the construction process of recognizing a group as discriminatedagainst: some of them affect the discriminated-against group members themselves,
while others affect the members of the hegemonic group, who also constitute the
28

It has been argued that the Court is approaching discrimination issues based on the assumption of
formal, blatant discrimination even though de jure discrimination almost is now rare. See Michael
Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L. J. 279,
285 (1997) (“As long as… blatant barriers do not exist, the Court has difficulty seeing discrimination”).
29
This Article’s interest is not in the ideological controversy over the force of law as a sociological
move or the law’s role in creating social norms. See Introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key
Writings That Formed the Movement, xxiv (Kimberle W. Crenshaw et al., 1995).
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shaping of the different groups, from inside the legal system (such as regulators,
lawyers and judges) and from outside of it.
Though comprising many of these methodological constituents at different
levels, the effects themselves are organized around their outcomes, meaning that they
are presented in correlation to the way they contribute to the process of founding the
discriminated-against group as a subject for relief implementation.30
The Article will now trace the effects that the different types of discrimination
have on creating a group as a legal entity in the remedial stage.31 The effects are all
relevant to the way in which a discriminated-against group's status as a legal entity,
with legal relevance to anti-discrimination relief, is generated. However, the effects
themselves are somewhat independent from one another and have a cumulative
influence on the formation of the group as legal entity, rather than having a gradual,
dependent influence where one effect flows from the other. Nevertheless, the common
thread between these effects is the way in which they allow the formation of de jure
discriminated-against groups as legal entities and the way the lack of these factors
burdens de facto discriminated-against groups.
The effects of de jure discrimination that will be addressed in this Part confine
the ability of a group to participate in the remedial stage, thus structurally barring
groups that are not victims of de jure but of de facto discrimination from benefiting
in the curing stage. For these groups that are "legally absent" groups, the
antidiscrimination battlefield is especially difficult, since they have to fight for redress
in an area where they were never formally acknowledged as injured.
1) The Semiotic Impact of Discrimination
a) The Distinctiveness Effect
Discrimination is a form of exclusion, which demands the identification and
acknowledgment of the excluded entity subject to different treatment. "Identifying"
the characteristics of the subject upon which exclusion is based requires that the
30

This article is less interested in the methodological motivations of the process of recognizing a group
as discriminated-against. Rather, it focuses on the legal aspects and manifestations of this process,
understood through the abovementioned methodological constituents.
31
In tracing these different stages, the Article does not intend to expose a coherent, consistent, and
gradual progress of the legal discourse on discrimination. Moreover, the different stages must have
been infused with and influenced one another and they may not even constitute some developmental
phases. Garry Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L. J. 758 (1990)
(considering some of the stages as a mere reflection of the opposing political ideologies of the
integrationist and the nationalist movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
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subject has a distinctiveness common with the excluded group. From this viewpoint,
the discourse of discrimination both causes the "other" to suffer from deprivation and,
at the same time, forms that same "other" group.32 Paradoxically, the discriminating
discourse retains some maneuvering potential since the legal language that the de jure
discrimination employs against the groups plays into the hands of these very same
discriminated groups when the remedial stage begins. Discriminated-against groups
can now use the same classifying rhetoric that was used to define and exclude their
group for their own benefit. In a sense, then, discriminated groups are able to trap the
legal system by its own definitional creations. In other words, a group's distinct
existence at the remedial stage is a consequence of the group identity and knowledge
that was produced by the prior stage’s discriminatory discourse that recognized the
group's “legal entity” by discriminating against that group. This existence of a "legal
entity" means that the discriminated against group need not prove that the group has
any "real" or essential existence; rather, the fact that the legal system treated the group
as real is sufficient. The legal system, which creates this group identity and
knowledge during the de jure discrimination phase, cannot ignore or re-contextualize
the group identity at the remedial stage. Especially for racially categorized groups,
whose composition is socially ambiguous and often based on vague characterizations,
this effect of the law creating their legal identity is highly valuable in the remedial
stage.33 It should be stressed, however, that this process does not imply that prior to it
there were no meanings of “race” attached to groups such as African-Americans or
Mexican-Americans outside the legal apparatus. Rather, it is suggested that racial
groups as we know them today within the antidiscrimination discourse were shaped,
in part, by the discrimination discourse.34
The African-American group is a prominent illustration of this effect. The
distinctiveness of the group was created through various discriminatory provisions of
the law that needed to and shamelessly did define what a "Negro” was.35 These
32
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definitions were designed to meet the need to statutorily identify a person for
exclusionary purposes36 and thereby created an indisputable "African-American legal
entity", sustained by a rhetoric that enabled the courts to identify the group and
exempted them from justifying their choices of identification. Moreover, the legal
system was indifferent to the divergent definitions used to “identify” the group, as the
notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson demonstrates. In Plessy, the Court considered
Louisiana’s legal definition of African-Americans to be a matter of state legislative
autonomy.37 The Court specifically refrained from defining the plaintiff’s race,
indicating that so long as the segregation laws identified him as “colored,” his unique
racial condition was legally irrelevant.38 The Court settled for the adoption of the
statute’s language as the relevant legal definition for identifying the plaintiff's group.
Adopting this definition also allowed the Court to ignore strong objections to the
notion that there is any “real” biological meaning to race.39
On the other hand, the courts’ desire to look to statutory definitions rather than
consider racial categorizations on their own initiative stood in the way of MexicanAmericans being recognized as a discriminated against group for remedial purposes.40
The first case to acknowledge Mexican-Americans as a legally identifiable non-white
group was Hernandez v. Texas,41 in 1954, where the Court concluded that the
systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury duty on the basis of their
“class” was unconstitutional.42 Nevertheless, in this decision the Court refused to
adopt a broad conception of the affected group and instead pointed to evidence about
the local discriminatory practices against Mexican-Americans; thus, the Court
established the existence of Mexicans-Americans as an identifiable class only within
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specific circumstances. The contrasting experience of African-Americans is
commonly shown, but is harder to trace, since for the Court, it is unquestioned that the
group is identifiable.43 For Example, in Brown v. Board of Education44, the Court,
introducing the various petitioners from different states, as “minors of the Negro
race,” affirmed and acknowledged, without reservation, their status as a generally
identifiable group.45 This group recognition has generalized not only different
geographic areas, but also various realms of discrimination, other than segregation in
education, to which the group recognition diffused.46
Although celebrated as a landmark step toward achieving legal visibility for
Mexican-Americans,47 Hernandez also posed a difficult legacy for the group, since it
relied on a localized rather than nationalized conception of the "group." This localized
conception forced later Mexican-American petitioners to bear the heavy cost of
repeatedly establishing local discrimination in each case. Strangely enough, for
example, a plaintiff with a similar claim of discrimination in jury selection in Texas
was forced to again prove that he belonged to an identifiable group because his
petition related to different county than the one at issue in Hernandez.48 This legacy
caused courts to refuse to recognize the group's standing for purposes of equal
protection claims. Even in cases when it was decided that Mexican-Americans were a
discriminated against group, like in the important case of Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Ind. School District,49 the court’s rhetoric was never the definitive rhetoric that would
have recognized Mexican-Americans as a broad, rather than a local, group. The
semiotic impact was apparent: lacking any de jure discrimination to define the group
before it, the Court has looked for "cultural", "biological", and "social" evidence to
support the existence of Mexican-Americans as a group.50 Moreover, the distinctive
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characteristics of Mexican-American's – such as their surnames, cultural heritage, and
appearance - have constantly been questioned on the grounds that they lack social
“realness” or relevance to creating a group identity for Mexican-Americans. This
confusion is captured in the sincere struggle of courts and their rhetoric inability to
conclusively identify the group before them:51
“It is clear to this court that Mexican-Americans, or Americans with
Spanish surnames, or whatever they are called, or whatever they would
like to be called, Latin-Americans, or several other new names of
identification -- and parenthetically the court will take notice that this
naming for identification phenomena is similar to that experienced in
the Negro groups: black, Negro, colored, and now black again, with an
occasional insulting epithet that is used less and less by white people…
fortunately…it is clear to this court that these people for whom we
have used the word Mexican-Americans to describe their class, group,
or segment of our population, are an identifiable ethnic minority…
This is not surprising; we can notice and identify their physical
characteristics, their language, their predominant religion, their distinct
culture, and, of course, their Spanish surnames.
In searching for "a name," and lacking any prior de jure definition of the
group, the court is forced to create the group on its own. Trying to come with an
acceptable definition, the court compares the naming difficulty with MexicanAmericans to the name changes that have accompanied the African-American group;
this comparison, though, exemplifies the differences between the groups caused by
their distinct discrimination forms. As opposed to court’s analogy, the "naming"
experiences of the two groups in fact diverged both in reason and in outcome. The
"list of names" for African-Americans that court lists represents the abundance of
identifications that were attached by de jure discrimination; thus, there was no
confusion or indeterminacy in the remedial stage, only different names attached to a
well-defined group. Thus, these names have not compromised the ability of courts to
consistently identify the group before them as the same group of African-Americans.
The Mexican-American "list" of names, however, demonstrates the lack of any prior
legal definition of the group for court to rely upon at the curing stage.

a footnote, considered an expert's testimony on the matter and discussed at length the characteristics of
an identifiable group. Id, id (footnotes 29 and 30).
51
Id, at 606-608.
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Later cases in which court again held that Mexican-Americans are an
identifiable class, like the infamous Keyes case,52 have not yet had the allencompassing effect of creating group recognition.53 In sum, unlike AfricanAmericans, Mexican-Americans had to each time first constitute themselves as a
group and only then make their specific allegations of discrimination. The United
States v. Texas Education Agency54 desegregation case is a sharp exemplary of that
effect. The petitioners in this case were both African-Americans and MexicanAmericans. Nevertheless, the Court voiced his concern only with whether the latter
constituted an identifiable group while having no similar concerns regarding the
former.55
b) The Visibility-Witnessing Effect (or "Unhappiness without a Title is
Double Unhappiness"56)
The legal discourse of discrimination not only classifies groups and shapes
their distinctiveness, but also manifests their presence. Presence is therefore the
signifie of discrimination, its signifiant.57 De jure discrimination gives public presence
to its subjects and narrates their discriminated experience. In the remedial stage, the
same narrative that was used by the legal system for discrimination against the group
is used to justify giving anti-discrimination relief to the members of that group.
Moreover, number of different situations in which de jure discrimination existed
created multiple narratives of oppression and exclusion that had to be revealed in the
remedial stage: where de jure discrimination ordered segregated schools, the narrative
of exclusion from the education system had been told; where it ordered employment
segregation, the narrative of exclusion from the employment market had been told;
and so forth. These narratives of discrimination, suffering, and deprivation were
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outlined by de jure regulations and affected the transparency and visibility of both the
group’s existence and the group's oppression.
This effect is part of a larger theoretical scheme of "visibility," emphasizing
the powerfulness of the legal discourse, which excludes minorities by their absence
them from legal texts and reasoning. This absence from the law's formal and
substantive foundations designate the excluded party as the "other" and demonstrate
that its needs are as unimportant to the legal world as they are elsewhere in society.58
The argument of this Article exceeds the limits of this "invisibility" critique. It argues
that “absence” refers not only to absence from receiving the benefits of the law, but
also an absence from suffering from the drawbacks of the law, specifically being
absent from the legal discrimination mechanism. The alleged invisibility of de jure
discriminated-against groups marks them as the "other," whereas the absence of de
facto discriminated-against groups signifies their complete non-existence.59 For
example, using legal language to determine the "nature" of a person in order to
classify him or her under a Jim Crow statute's requirements shapes the notion of a
legal category. Silence, on the other hand, is a choice not only not to include but also
a choice at the same time not to exclude. Silence is the decision to "non-clude." By
"non-cluding," this Article means a situation where a group is being discriminated
against yet is not being subjugated by explicit formal expressions of the law. The
group is fully "named" by society's coercion since it suffers from discrimination, but
is nameless under the law. Moreover, it does not exist as a group or entity. Although it
is true that discriminated-against groups such as women and African-Americans also
suffered from injustice and inequality that might be termed "lawlessness," they were
at the same time subject to the control of the legal system and thus were subject to
lawfulness.60 These groups are therefore relatively visible on the spectrum of
"visibility"; in contrast, Mexican-Americans fall into a category of extreme
invisibility.
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De facto discriminated against groups extends another extreme of the visibility
spectrum. “Invisibility” is commonly used to describe also the omnipresence of a
group that need not be “named”, rather than describe the non-existence of the “unnamed” group. Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and treating the law as a
quintessential arena of symbolic power, one can regard the normative classification of
“whiteness” as unmarked and “blackness” as marked as an objectified form of white
hegemony.61 The invisible unmarked or “un-named” is the group whose dominance
and hegemony shapes the relevant social system and thus does not need to be
explicitly named and presented.62 In legal terms, critical theory argues that the law
represents the white-male-heterosexual epistemology and life-experience and thus this
group does not need to be named in the law.63 Therefore, this archetype's absence
from the legal texts is misleading since it reflects the group's constituting presence. In
this Article, however, the terminology of “un-naming” is being used in a different
manner. By “un-named” groups, this Article means those that suffer from an impotent
absence, and not from an all-encompassing omnipresence. This Article contrasts the
“naming” of minorities, such as African-Americans and women, not only with the
“un-naming” of the dominant group of white men but also with the “un-naming” of
other discriminated-against groups. Considering these other discriminated-against
groups visible challenges the traditional conceptualization of “naming” as
exclusionary and “un-naming” as inclusive. Instead, this Article suggests a broader
conception that will treat the “un-named” discriminated groups as being as invisible
as a group can be. Moreover, the invisible normality of whiteness manifested in the
law as well as achieved through it, engages the law as a “white public space” in which
the unmarked is simply white.64 In this symbolic space, the un-named group is
eliminated and marginalized as a discriminated-against group, through its being
merged into the white public space as an inseparable part of it. However, this process
61
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does not signify inclusion of the group, since in reality it is discriminated-against, de
facto.
The theoretical scheme of "invisibility" this Article addresses is affected by
the legal visibility of the group as follows. Different, relative degrees of legal
visibility and invisibility are located on a continuum. At one end there are laws that
make the "otherness" of the laws' subject explicit. For example, laws denying access
to public facilities that specifically named "Blacks" made the "otherness" of AfricanAmericans apparent. In this case the discriminated group is more overtly
distinguished than with laws where the ban is, for example, on "Colored" people,
which is a general term encompassing various non-white groups.65 Next to these
explicit laws on the continuum are implied laws, such as laws with a "whites only"
requirement. This sort of implicit law does not "name" the other, rather "names" the
opposite, privileged entity. Here, the group's absence could nevertheless signify its
existence because of the statute’s “wholeness” impact. According to this impact,
discriminatory statutes are always positioned within a semantic field of "social power
relations" where the oppressor and oppressed groups are "different" from one another
and can signify one another.66 In the relatively narrow area of legal discrimination,
naming the privileged group in a statute signifies the discriminated group as missing
from the holistic frame of the oppressor and the oppressed, namely, from the statute's
wholeness. For example, due to the black-white paradigm, "African-Americans" are
members of a set of mutually exclusive forms of discrimination with "whites" as their
opposite. This dichotomy is why statutorily privileging a "white" group would signify
the presence of its "other," specifically African-Americans, but not, for example, the
presence of Mexican-Americans, since Mexican-Americans are not the dichotomous
opposite of "whites" and thus are not signified by the inclusion of "whites". Alongside
this spectrum of visibility, both explicit and implicit de jure discrimination enhances
the formation of the discriminated group as an entity.
In sum, de jure discrimination affects the magnitude of the visibility both of
the existence of the group itself and of its discrimination-based suffering. Working
from within the legal system, de jure discrimination brought the groups it defined into
65
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a canonical status through legal texts. Law canonizes discriminated groups, providing
them the necessary "naming" for all prospective antidiscrimination purposes during a
later remedial stage.67 Being named by the law has implications just as being named
by the social sphere or by politicians would. Formal de jure discrimination is more
systematic and more exposed to the public than de facto discrimination is, thereby
conveying greater visibility to the subjects of that discrimination. This effect helps
explain the weak position of Mexican-Americans in the American antidiscrimination
discourse. Although Mexican-Americans are relatively physically distinct, their
recognition as a discriminated-against group has lacked any “legal” support since they
were not discriminated-against by the law; this lack of "legal" support deprives the
group of legal viability in asserting their claims during the remedial stage.
2) The Collaborating-Organizational Effect
a) Through intra-group reactions
The ability and potential of minorities to politically organize has a key role in
affecting their political power. Ackerman, who discusses minorities' entitlement to
judiciary protection, refers to the idea of a “pluralist democracy,” which assumes that
various interest groups negotiate with one another about the rules that they eventually
democratically legislate. Within this framework, minority groups suffer from a
systematic disadvantage, due to their lack of power to negotiate with the powerful
majority.68 A famous dictum by Justice Stone in the Carolene Products case
suggested that “discrete and insular minorities” were the ones who suffered most from
democratic ineffectiveness and were the ones who were eligible for and entitled to
protection from the judiciary when the legislature failed to provide such protection.
Ackerman criticizes the Court’s definition. Both insularity and discreteness, he
argues, have an empowering rather than a disempowering effect on the political
bargaining power of a group, since these characteristics make the groups more able to
operate collectively.69 Here, again, the powerful effect of de jure discrimination is of
enormous relevance. Using legislation to discriminate provokes a sharper sense of
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humiliation, of otherness, and of alienated outsiderness.70 The law functions as a
primary (among other) social instrument in racializing the group, mainly for
subordinating purposes.71 Consequentially, a group member's consciousness of being
discriminated against revolves around the notion of the group's oppression as a whole,
and formal, de jure discrimination makes that group oppression much more powerful,
painful, and outrageous, thus enhancing an intra-group interaction and collectivity. On
the other hand, groups that do not suffer from blatant, evidential, formal
discrimination, but rather suffer from more covert discrimination, are expected to
have a lesser sense of group identity and a higher level of self-denial of their
discriminated position, and of intra-group collectivity.
In the terms of Ackerman’s critique, the geographical insularity of the group is
less effective and the discreteness of the group is blurred with non-de jure
discriminated against groups. The consciousness of any group of its own identity is a
crucial prerequisite for any organized political action. Hence, the geographical
advantage is particularly effective where the group has a discrimination-oriented
consciousness and is less effective in cases where the group lacks such a
consciousness or where that consciousness is less pronounced. As history
demonstrates, although both African-Americans and Mexican-Americans lived in
insularity as groups, the former was more able successfully to organize as a
community, to develop a racially proud consciousness, and eventually to better,
relatively speaking, their social status.72
This effect of de jure discrimination has been previously observed. In
criticizing the transition from the formal discrimination era of Jim Crow to the formal
equality era, Kimberle Crenshaw points to the problematic effects that this transition
has had on the African-American community. Crenshaw criticizes the fact that what
was primarily abolished through that transition was the symbolic oppression of
African-Americans represented by legal ordinances, rather than actual, material
oppression, which consisted of less formal discriminating practices.73 AfricanAmericans derived much of the collective political power within their community
from the formal nature of their discrimination, not only vis-à-vis Whites, but also visà-vis themselves. The one-rule-to-all discrimination imposed upon African-Americans
70
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by de jure discrimination had an inclusive effect and almost of all the community
members--even its most advantaged and pro-assimilationist members--were unable to
avoid or deny their belonging to the group. This discrimination imprisoned all of them
under its strict rules, without exception, rendering inefficient most assimilationist
strategies. Once the shift was made to the formal equality era, important portions of
the group, particularly those well-off or assimilationist African-Americans, parted
from it in what Crenshaw calls “the loss of collectivity.”74 Prior to that stage, even the
Integrationist Movement, a pro-assimilation movement, emphasized difference in its
agenda and had no illusions of African-Americans belonging to the white
hegemony.75 Dr. King, an integrationist himself, strictly called upon disobedience to
de jure discrimination.76 De jure discrimination was also the reason for the evolution
of and the main target of the revolutionary Black Civil Rights Movement,77 whose
consciousness was built upon fighting the evil of institutionalized discrimination. A
black scholar once wrote: "Law does not exist in a vacuum and racism is not solely a
by-product of law."78 This statement is an apt description of the mindset of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960's. De jure discrimination has been a very powerful
motivation for the Movement’s admirable struggle.79
Crenshaw located her critique within the African-Americans and WhiteAmericans relations, but it can be easily applied to this Article's analysis within
discriminated-against groups. Unlike their African-American peers, MexicanAmericans did not suffer from blatant, formally legal alienation and thus were not as
easily considered-- either by themselves or by others--as “out-laws” from the social
system. Drawing on Crenshaw’s work, one can infer that the lack of de jure
discrimination caused “loss of collectivity” within the Mexican-American
consciousness and encouraged the weak ties between their community identities and a
racial identity, as opposed to such strong ties within African-Americans.80 The
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absences of de jure discrimination sent a message of assimilation and of false
belonging to the hegemony,81 which made an elaborated legal fight appear irrelevant
or even unwanted.82 The history of the Mexican-American civil rights movements
thus is more complex and assimilative than the history of the African-American civil
rights movement does. Organizations like the League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC), established in the late 1920's, and the Mexican American's Legal
Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), established in the late 1960's, took the
lead in litigating against the de facto discrimination Mexican-Americans suffered.83
They relied overwhelmingly on an integrationist and assimilative ideology rather than
on a separatist or a group-collectivist ideology; perhaps partly for this reason, these
groups have failed to receive nationwide attention, despite their considerable
achievements.84 Scholars speculate as to the conditions that have shaped this strategy,
and the suggestions have ranged from the community’s weak social and political
condition to an incompatibility among the personalities of the leadership.85 I suggest
another factor, namely the ambiguity on the part of the American legal system about
the group’s legal status. The fact that the law did not discriminatorily define the group
has had an anti-radical impact on the self-consciousness and self-perception of its
members and leaders with regard to their belonging to a discriminated against group.
Another aspect of intra-group interaction to which Ackerman points is that the
more discrete the members of a group are, the easier it is to track them and commit
them to the group’s political struggle. African-Americans are an example of a discrete
group, who because of their skin color are easy to track; Ackerman presents
homosexuals as a counterexample, since their membership is more anonymous and
not superficially prominent, thereby making homosexuals harder to track and
politically mobilize. Ackerman furthers argues that even when tracked, a group
member would have to let go of his or her anonymity in order to engage in a political
81
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struggle and that this

revealing

is something members of anonymous groups would

hesitate to do. By so doing, a member of the anonymous group would risk “revealing”
his or her identity and would position himself or herself on a social battlefield.86
Ackerman's discussion of "discreteness" focuses on the physical "visibility" of the
group, but this Article focuses on the legal dimension of discreteness. Once the group
is visible to the law, meaning that it has been defined and recognized by the legal
system through de jure discrimination, that group also becomes more politically
visible. Thus, although homosexuals are relatively "socially invisible," this Article
argues that homosexuals are substantively "legally present" and enjoy a substantial
amount of political visibility.
The discourse of sexual orientation-based discrimination dealt initially with
prohibitions on sodomy.87 Later, the struggle for homosexual rights targeted other de
jure provisions, again triggering a legal discussion that increased the legal visibility of
the group. Until Romer v. Evans,88the Court did not find homosexuals to legally
constitute a group that was entitled to special constitutional protections. Moreover, in
the first case to discuss homosexual's right to equal protection, Bowers v. Hardwick,89
the discussion revolved around homosexual activity rather than homosexuals as an
entity or group. But Romer led to the law considering homosexuals as a group, even
though Romer did not grant homosexuals all of the constitutional protection they
sought. In Romer, homosexuals were discriminated against de jure by a state
constitution, so the Court’s discussion also has a group-based orientation. Thus, the
distinctiveness given to the group by the legislature made the group legally viable.90
Considering groups that are discriminated against de facto extends
Ackerman’s conception of discreteness to a symbolic level where the law constitutes
presence. In contrast to homosexuals, members of de facto discriminated against
groups suffer from “legal anonymity". They are locked in a "legal closet", which
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enhances their chances for assimilation and enables them to refrain from political
confrontations.91 In contrast, legally discrete groups who earn their discreteness from
de jure discrimination cannot as easily ignore or deny their oppression and are more
limited in their assimilation ability. Thus, members of these groups are far more likely
to be ready to organize politically to fight for better treatment. The legal discreteness
of de jure discriminated against groups also creates a supportive social-political
environment both among the group members and also in the form of goodwill from
people outside the group who support the abolition of the recognized de jure
discrimination.92 Having said all that, it is importantly noted that de jure
discrimination is not the exclusive way through which political collectivity and
consciousness can be achieved. These can be attained through different and complex
routes, of which de jure discrimination is only one primary example.93
b) Through inter-group reactions
Legally institutionalized discrimination enhances also the consciousness of
members outside the discriminated-against group whose members are "legally marked
out" in a way that makes it relatively easy for others to identify them.94 Reflecting this
notion is Dean Ely’s psychological approach to the legislative process, which
represents de jure discrimination as a positioning of the relations between the relevant
groups in a “we”-“they” dichotomy. "We" refers to the hegemonic oppressor,
represented by the legislative and "they" refers to the de jure discriminated against
group.95 In this framework, discrimination constitutes the other as a "minority", in the
sense of a majority manifesting political superiority over the minority and hence
forcing the minority to admit its relative political powerlessness and recognize its
proper place within social power relationships. For example, African-Americans, as
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the addressees of the discriminating laws, could not see themselves as its authors.96
Understood this way, a lack of de jure discrimination against a de facto discriminated
group creates an "we-all" as opposed to a "we-they" political structure, which eases
any traces of distinctiveness and discourages the development of a group
consciousness among the de facto discriminated against group.
This notion is clear in the Mexican-American case, where since they suffered
from de facto discrimination, Mexican-Americans were treated by court as "the other
white," a group that deserved not to be discriminated against. This “other white”
strategy97 demonstrates the coalescing effect, where neither side in the discriminatory
regime develops a consciousness of real power relations between the parties.
Moreover, symbolically this strategy was a statement about the inclusiveness of
Mexican-Americans and their lack of distinctiveness from whites.98 In Mendez v.
Westminster School Dist. Of Orange County,99 where Mexican-Americans won the
right to have schools integrated because the court considered them to be "white"," the
court distinguished them from de jure discriminated against groups. Relying on
California’s rules forbidding discrimination unless it was against colored and black
people, the court concluded that the discrimination against the plaintiffs was
unconstitutional. This decisions furthered the symbolic effect of the “we”-“they”
dichotomy, whereby Mexican Americans were placed within the “we” group and not
in the “they” group. Mexican-Americans were thus considered “one of the great
races” and contrasted with other races that were denied equal participation in
education.100 But this placement of Mexican-Americans in the "we" group fails to
acknowledge the power relations between Whites and Mexican-Americans. In this
power relationship, Mexican-Americans are a discriminated against minority, but the
court's decisions instead position Mexican-Americans side by side with whites. Thus,
de jure discriminated against groups, were marked as “the real” others, whereas
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Mexican-Americans were not the other. This explains part of the difficulty Mexican
Americans had in their quest for recognition as a “group”.101
3) The Institutional Memory and Blameworthy Effects
Antidiscrimination rules are meant to rectify the countermajoritanian
difficulties minorities face and to redress harmful injuries that the law or society has
inflicted upon them. 102 Therefore, institutional memory and blameworthiness suggest
that it is important for the same legal mechanisms that discriminated to be the
mechanisms used to provide the remedies. De jure discrimination provides direct,
formal access to the legal system's remedial functions for de jure discriminatedagainst groups. The formalism of the legal system and the documentary nature of de
jure discrimination make such discrimination impossible for the legal system to
ignore. De jure discrimination is less likely or plausibly to be denied than de facto
discrimination is. Although nations tend to forget their historical evils,
institutionalized documents make such forgetfulness harder. A legislative and
adjudicative change of hearts does not erase the legal history of a nation, but rather
place another narrative next to that history. Discriminatory legal rules can be
expunged from a nation’s book of statutes, but their past existence viability is always
evident and traceable. The vast documentation of the Jim Crow regulations and the
judicial revisiting of Dred Scott103 and Plessy demonstrate the strong presence of the
past institutional suffering of African-Americans. This documented past was during
the remedial stage a source for vast legal condemnation of the past institutional
suffering and thus a firm justification for remediation.104
De jure discrimination powerfully situates its subjects within the legal system
as the subjects of legal practice. Reflecting again on Ackerman’s work, one might
observe that the judiciary restricts its activism with regard to “non-legal” issues. The
judiciary's commitment to protecting discrete and insular minorities assumes some
prior legal recognition of such minority groups. Therefore, it is crucial to understand
the discrete and insular minorities test as being inherently legal. This test aims at
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protecting groups from de jure discrimination alone. Other forms of discrimination
are not thought of as proper areas for judicial intervention due to the traditional
legal/social dichotomy that seeks to preserve the "social" as a sphere beyond equality
law and thus that allows for the continuation of racial inequality outside the official
reach of the state.105 As this Article has previously argued, Mexican-Americans were
only partially recognized by the legal system. Since they did not suffer from de jure
discrimination, it was easier to consider Mexican-Americans to be a “social” rather
than a “legal” entity. The Court’s reluctance to declare that the discrimination against
Mexican-Americans was de jure meant that Mexican-Americans had no legal
relevance as a group. In the Hernandez case, the Court focused to “social”
motivations for discrimination rather than “legal” ones, thus deriving the “emergence”
of the Mexican-American group within this specific from a change in "community
prejudices" against them. Moreover, the wisdom of the Court's reliance on "social
changes" triggering recognition of Mexican-Americans is challenged by the fact that
discrimination against Mexican-American was by far long lasting.106 In the case of de
jure discriminated-against groups, the law’s involvement transformed what might
have otherwise been considered a "wholly social" matter in to a “wholly legal” one,
by establishing the group as having legal viability. For example, in the famous case of
Strauder v. West Virginia,107 the Court focused on the devastating impact of de jure
discrimination in excluding African-Americans from “civil society.” This observation
conceives the social harm inflicted on them as also being a legal harm.
Many conservative legal theories and positive legalism claim that law merely
reflects society's desires. The critique from the left, on the other hand, argues that the
law is actively involved in the production and maintenance of society's power
relations. This debate, though, is less important once legal involvement is present in
the wronging. Through de jure discrimination the legal system created as well as
reflected reality, unraveling the line between the legal and the social realms.108 Under
these circumstances, adherence to the legal righting process is to be expected, because
once the law had been formally involved in "wronging," there is a need for it to
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reverse its involvement. The high attention that de jure discriminated-against groups
receive from the legal system during the remedial stage can be understood as a result
of a corrective justice aspiration of the legal system to right undeniable past wrongs
that were caused by this very same system.109
Affirmative action is the most prominent manifestation of this effect.
Although the American legal system had not yet developed a well-established
position as to affirmative action's constitutionality or normative desirability,
affirmative action programs have nonetheless been judicially approved.110 The
inclination of courts in these cases to generally hold against general affirmative action
programs while approving programs that aim to remedy concrete legal discrimination
highlights the importance of de jure discrimination. The more concrete and unjust the
past discrimination was--particularly if such discrimination resulted from the legal
system itself rather than simply from society--the more justified present affirmative
action is.111 This is the essence of antidiscrimination law, as Robert Post describes it:
“…antidiscrimination law always begins and ends in history, which means that it
must participate in the very practices that it seeks to alter and regulate.”112 The
involvement of the judiciary benefiting de jure discriminated-against groups in the
remedial stage can thus be understood as being motivated by institutional
remorsefulness.113
A story of one Mexican-American battle against discrimination can also help
illustrate this effect. The story, called “The Felix Longoria Incident”, occurred in
Texas in 1949. Longoria was an American soldier who died during World War II. The
local mortician refused to allow him to be buried at the chapel because of Longoria’s
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Mexican origin.114 Hector Garcia, an activist working for a Mexican-American Forum
challenged this discrimination. As with most of the discriminatory acts against
Mexican-Americans in Texas, the burial refusal was not de jure based. As
demonstrated by the substantial sympathetic public attention that this case received,
the public reaction to the discrimination claim – one of denial — was of a different
nature than if the discrimination had been based in law and hence “legal”. The
incident was portrayed as an atypical incident, even though in fact separate burial
services and cemeteries were common. It was resolved as a misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the funeral house owner's words. Since the mortician's behavior
lacking any official approval in law, the public blamed Garcia for stirring up trouble
in an area where problems did not truly existed
These types of public denials of the reality of discrimination are typical with
non-de jure discrimination. Similar de jure discrimination could not have been
denied. The truth of de jure discrimination neither relies on matters of interpretation
over “what exactly has been said” nor does it rely on the credibility of the party
alleging discrimination, since in both cases the law is clearly authorizing
discrimination. Since de jure discrimination is institutionalized, its effect cannot be
dismissed as a private, unrepresentative dispute as de facto discrimination often can
be. Declaring war on de jure discrimination is more likely to generate public support
than war on de facto discrimination, to which the public might respond as it did to
Garcia's work that the activists are just stirring up trouble. De jure discrimination is
more difficult to rationalize or deny. As a result, this de facto discrimination case with
the Texas burial was resolved on a very local, specific, "non-legal" level and the
mortician agreed, eventually, to bury Longoria.
4) The Presumption of Intentional Discrimination Effect
The legacy of de jure discrimination has an active role in proving the
discriminatory intent of a challenged discriminatory act. The presence of de jure
discrimination is an important factor in establishing that a discriminatory act was
intentional. This role is exemplified by the Court's statement that the intent behind
explicit de jure discrimination in the past may be used in the present to prove intent
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regardless of chronological remoteness.115 Unsurprisingly, this logic was applied
primarily in cases where de jure discrimination previously existed.116 The practical
implication of this logic is large because equal protection claims are limited to claims
that can prove intentional discrimination, and this logic allows the court to assume
intentional discrimination. This logic thus has a "narrating" effect, where it allows the
group's narrative of oppression to be told.117 Moreover, the "narrating" effect also has
an epistemological effect by causing the narrated information to be absorbed into the
formal legal system and used by the narrating group to achieve redress for past
discrimination. In other words, the logic is that the institutionalization of de jure
discrimination signified a pattern of oppressive behavior that could be used to prove
intentionality, whereas de facto discrimination was perceived as non-institutional,
incidental, and random and thus could not be used to prove the intentionality
necessary to assert an equal protection claim.118
Conclusion: Externalities for Cases of De Facto Discrimination
The formal, overt, linguistic dimension of different forms of discrimination has
powerful effects that both courts and scholars have so far neglected. As with any
discourse, the discrimination discourse dictates the way in which discriminated
groups are construed and imposes frameworks that structure what can be experienced
or what meaning an experience can encompass. Thus, discourse influences what can
be said, thought, and done.
The unhappy result of the fact that discrimination discourse is framed in the
context of de jure discrimination, is that it prevents the formation of group identities
of de facto discriminated-against groups, whose composition might be more complex,
contextualized, and historicized than the composition of de jure discriminated against
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groups.119 Thus, the primacy of de jure discrimination in the discrimination discourse
shaped the way in which the formation of "legally cognized groups" became possible
and thereby limited the antidiscrimination discourse to encompassing primarily de
jure discriminated against groups. De jure discrimination structured what could or
could not be included in the discrimination discourse; most importantly, the
dominance of de jure discrimination largely prevented de facto discriminated groups
from participating in the antidiscrimination discourse.
It is important to note though that there is no strict, clear relation between the
legal status of a group and the social status of a group as one that is discriminated
against. Some groups may not be discriminated-against by the law and yet suffer
discrimination from society. De facto discriminated-against groups demonstrate this
idea well. At the same time, some groups may be de jure discriminated against by the
law without being discriminated against by society in fact.120 Nevertheless, in
between these poles, there is certainly a correlation between the use of the law to
order society and between enhancing the social and self-awareness around a group
subjugated to de jure discrimination in a way needed for that group to initiate an
effective legal and political struggle for rights. Moreover, removing a group from
society's legal canon and by no longer discriminating against it under the law, in the
antidiscrimination stage also creates some sense of social commitment to equality visà-vis that group.121
Part III:
The Battle for Segregation in Education as a Test Case
The impact of the abovementioned effects on equal protection doctrine is
somewhat elusive and will be introduced in this Part by examining the segregation in
education litigation of both African and Mexican Americans. The impact is more
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apparent in the Mexican-American litigation, where the court refused to identify the
group, and less apparent in African-American litigation, where the court refrained
from any similar discussion of group identity. Rulings on education segregation
regarding theses groups demonstrate this difference in impact. Both groups suffered
from segregation in education, but while African-Americans suffered mainly from de
jure discrimination, Mexican-Americans suffered almost exclusively from de facto
discrimination. In terms of judicial success, Mexican-Americans were the firsts to win
a segregation battle, in the Mendez case in 1946.122. But African-Americans won the
war in the broader legal sense with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.123 Although
vastly criticized,124 this decision is a cornerstone of abolishing segregation and the
"separate but equal" doctrine. A compelling explanation for Brown's central status in
the discrimination discourse might be its emphasis on African-Americans' suffering
and social exclusion through de jure discrimination. The NAACP, which argued the
case, narrated African-American suffering through briefs and professional opinions
and court embraced that narrative,125 stressing the story of the group’s oppression:
"To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone".126 Court thus
brought the suffering of African-American children--and through them the AfricanAmerican people--into the legal system and made that suffering intrinsic to the
group's legal entity. The institutionalized discrimination at issue in the case also
represented the broader story of discrimination of educational bodies against AfricanAmericans.127 In Brown, Court has recognized the existence of a suffering,
discriminated-against general group of African-Americans. Introducing the petitioners
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as “minors of the Negro race,” Court has affirmed, and acknowledged without
reservations their status as a legally identifiable group.128
The impact of Brown was "legal recognition," as Derrick Bell states: "The
significance of this decision is that it altered the status of African-Americans who
were no longer supplicants … 'seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged
members of the human race….'"129 More importantly, from Brown onward, the
viability of every segregation claim brought into court by African-Americans was
immediately and fully discussed. No special rhetoric and epistemological efforts were
required by courts to define the petitioners or their discriminated-against position.
This ease of asserting claims was the unfelt yet crucial impact of de jure
discrimination, which established African-Americans’ group recognition.130 The
conceptualization of the litigation as one seeking equality between different
identifiable groups prompted African-Americans seeking for equality to bring their
segregation claims to court. De jure discrimination thus had a structural effect that
enabled the group to gain control over attempts to reshape the educational system.131
The experience of Mexican-Americans seeking to gain legal recognition as a
group differed tremendously from that of African-Americans.132 As this Article has
argued earlier, the discrimination against Mexican-Americans was primarily non-de
jure and their status as a legally cognizable minority group is fragile.133 The scarcity
of legislation related to Mexican-Americans led to an insufficient amount of litigation
by or against Mexican-Americans, which prevented a coherent and a comprehensive
identity of the group and its real suffering from forming. Mendez, one of the few cases
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to have dealt with de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, is thus
unsurprisingly considered a milestone in the group's struggle for equality.
Nevertheless, the Mendez decision blurred the legal status of Mexican-Americans as
an identifiable group and blurred their suffering. Considering them to be "whites," the
court said that since they were "whites" they were not appropriate subjects for
discriminatory treatment since state law did not allow for discrimination against
whites.134 This strategy of labeling Mexican-Americans as white was destructive to
Mexican-Americans, since it did not mesh with social behavior toward MexicanAmericans or with the power relation from which Mexican-Americans suffered.135
And with this rare de jure discrimination case, it is clear that a statute explicitly
allowing de jure segregation of Mexican-Americans would have destroyed the court's
reasoning; if de jure segregation had been applied against Mexican-Americans, it
could have surfaced the suffering of the Mexicans-American group.
Mendez was followed by Gonzales v. Sheely,136 in which a federal court in
Arizona ruled on a segregation claim. Like Mendez, this case was also highly
atypically and based on de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans. In
Gonzales, the court identified the petitioners before him as a class based on the fact
that the regulations allowed the segregation of “all children of persons of Mexican or
Latin descent or extraction”; thus, the court used this de jure “naming” of the group in
its ruling.137 Court also referred to such blatant segregation as degrading and fostering
antagonism against and inferiority in Mexican-American children.138 In later cases,
however, where the discrimination was not de jure as in Mendez and Gonzales, legal
recognition of Mexican-Americans as a group has not been forthcoming. Courts,
frightened by their inability to determine precisely the contours of the group,
continued to only apply ad-hoc group recognition to the specific petitioners before the
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court rather than recognize Mexican-Americans as a group more generally.139 Without
a general recognition for the group, the group members had to reassert and reconstruct
each time the group identity in order to assert discrimination claims. Later on, the
prerequisite that challenged discrimination be de jure rather than de facto blocked
many other petitions challenging discrimination against Mexican-Americans.140
Along with other factors, the effects of the discrimination against Mexican-Americans
being de facto rather than de jure can help understand how in contrast to AfricanAmericans, Mexican-Americans today continue to attend the most segregated schools
and today they are "more segregated" and "more concentrated in high-poverty schools
than any other group of students” in the United States.141
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identity.145 The use of more flexible terms like “national origin” to describe groups
against which discrimination is prohibited has an inclusive effect of helping establish
group identity for many de facto discriminated-against groups.146 Likewise, the
“unreasonable classification” discourse that evolved during this colorblind era
displaced the racial oppression discourse, which was a key factor in making
recognized group as a discriminated-against one.147 Within this new system, the status
of de facto discriminated-against groups has improved because these changes have
given hope for recognition of the group and for full participation in antidiscrimination
relief.148 Moreover, the Civil Rights Acts banned a larger range of discriminatory
practices than just simple de jure ones, including relatively “private” forms that were
closer to de facto discrimination. The Civil Rights Acts banned both intentional and
unintentional discrimination and has largely departed from the old view of the Equal
Protection Clause primarily redressing de jure discrimination.149 These notions have
influenced the recognition of groups in equal protection claims. With MexicanAmericans, in this era the group began to be recognized as either a “race” or as a
“national origin.”150 In contrast, in the new legal order where de jure discrimination
has ceased, the powerful effects of legal symbolization of African-American racial
existence and suffering led to the false belief that racism ended, even though the
material subordination of African-Americans has not stopped. Rather, discrimination
against African-Americans has become more de facto-based than de jure-based, and
has thus become harder to claim and to fight.151
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Part IV: Pleading and Proving Discrimination within the Streaming from De
facto to De jure Paradigm – A Call for Substance, Context, and Consciousness
This Article stresses a phenomenological analysis, thus it is beyond the
confines of the article to suggest a full elaboration of the different ways through
which the legal system should treat differently discriminated-against groups. Instead,
in this Part the Article briefly points to the general possibility of expanding the limits
of the rights discourse through contextualization so that the rights discourse can
include de facto discriminated-against groups in its remedial stage. In order to
accomplish this inclusion, the legal system needs to develop a mechanism for
pleading and proving discrimination within the streaming from de facto/de jure
paradigm that uses a contextualized and historicized approach to inquire into the
social-political background of the formation of a group as discriminated-against. Law
and its rights discourse are highly de-contextualized and de-historicized by their
alleged objective and universal nature, and thus they lack the conceptual room to
consider contextualized issues.152 But it is only by being read against a contextual
background that the absence of de facto discriminated-against racial groups from the
legal narrative be understood as signifying double discrimination rather than as
signifying no discrimination. The argument here suggests that the law should move
toward a contextual and flexible test when implementing the Equal Protection Clause.
Of course, however, there are many factors that go into framing the proper rule, and
this Article's focus is too narrow to discuss all of them, but nonetheless the arguments
laid out here do suggest at least some movement toward greater contextualization and
flexibility in applying antidiscrimination laws.
Contextualizing the discrimination discourse is compatible with the
transformation through which discrimination as a social construct has been going as it
moved in the last decades from first-generation discrimination to second-generation
discrimination.153 One prominent characteristic of this transformation is that
discrimination is typically no longer formal and blatant but rather is contextual and
relational. The disappearance of blatant and intentional, discrimination practices and
the emergence of more subtle ones represent this conceptual and structural shift in the
discrimination
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uncontroversial norms of fairness and formal equality. In contrast, second generation
discrimination frequently involves patterns of interaction among groups that over time
lead to the exclusion of non-dominant groups in a way that makes the discrimination
difficult to trace back to the intentional, discrete actions of particular actors.154 The
absence of systematic institutional reflection about these patterns of second generation
discrimination contributes to its cumulative discriminatory effect.155 This generational
distinction is helpful in analyzing the de jure/de facto distinction’s role in forming
legally

cognizable

discriminated-against

groups.

The

first

generation's

institutionalized, horizontal, and formal discrimination scheme is the de jure style of
discrimination, whereas the second generation is a more complex and contextual style
of discrimination, the de facto style of discrimination. But although de facto
discriminated groups suffer from second generation discrimination style, they may
suffer from it within a system that is also engaged in first generation discrimination.
The experience of these de facto discriminated-against groups challenges the onedimensional perception of discrimination. These groups are legal non-entities that
signify the existence of sophisticated discrimination forms within what firstgeneration discrimination. Indeed, one role de jure discrimination plays is to hide the
existence of co-existing de facto discrimination, and antidiscrimination laws should
keep this role in mind.
In this respect, this Article joins other calls to employ a critical approach to
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.156 With de facto discriminated-against groups,
courts must adopt alternative, less formal ways of proving discrimination. An
example of this approach is Supreme Court’s decision in Castaneda v. Partida, where
the Court applied a substantive test to gauge discrimination. The Mexican-American
petitioner alleged a violation of the equal protection clause in a Texas jury selection.
Ruling in the Mexican-American's favor, Court relied on statistical evidences on the
low percentage of Mexican-American jurors, concluding that this low percentage
could only be explained by intent to discriminate. Although it has not waived the
intentional discrimination prerequisite for asserting equal protection claims, the Court
has relaxed the traditional practice that proving intent requires a demonstration of de
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jure discrimination.157 Later in this case, the Court also affirmed the status of
Mexican-Americans as an identifiable group and on that basis upheld the petitioner's
constitutional claim.
A critical test seeking to provide substantial protection against discrimination
would need to be aware of and concerned with the formal-substantive discrimination
distinction. The unique situation of de facto discriminated-against groups compels the
application of a more flexible, contextualized and historicized tests to deal with their
discrimination claims. Courts should be more suspicious of the harm that de facto
discriminated-against groups have suffered. In the case of Mexican Americans, courts
should not require petitioners to prove each time that they are a discriminated-against
group, and courts should also not limit their rulings to the specific circumstances of
each case.
The case for Mexican-American should be thus contextualized. Reflecting on
the relationship between legal recognition and de jure discrimination, a simple
proposition might be that an explanation for the higher levels of recognition given to
de jure discriminated-against groups is the supposition that these groups suffered
more. This might be true, but as a theoretical matter the nature of the suffering--be it
de jure or de facto--should have no bearing on whether a group is recognized as a
group and is entitled to de jure antidiscrimination remedies in its favor, but rather on
the breadth of these remedies.
Whatever the motives behind the non-de jure discrimination of the MexicanAmericans were,158 the outcome of that discrimination was legally-untraceable
discrimination. This form of untraceable discrimination further disadvantaged this
group vis-à-vis de jure discriminated-against groups during the remedial stage.
Mexican-Americans were subjugated by a hegemony that was not too “different”
from them, compared with the other de jure discriminated-against group of African157

For a flexible test that finds intentional discrimination with Mexican-Americans, see Ian F. Haney
Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 Yale
L. J. 1711 (2000). The use of statistics to find intentional discrimination is rare. Constitutional Law,
supra note 6, at 524.
158
With regard to Mexican-Americans, for example, one can speculate that the strong oppressive effect
of de facto discrimination made it unnecessary for the hegemony to use the explicit form of de jure
discrimination. Another speculation might be that diplomatic issues with Mexico, which strongly
opposed a race-based differentiation of Mexican-Americans, contributed to the U.S. refraining from
using the de jure discrimination apparatus. Greenfield & Kates, supra note 8, at 683-684. This was
especially relevant in light of the U.S.-Mexico treaties that promised citizenship to former Mexicans as
“whites”. Inland Steel Co. v. Barcelona, 39 N.E. 2nd 800 (Ind. 1942). It is also plausible to assume that
the Mexican-American elite itself opposed such de jure practices, mainly out of a belief that this would
grant them access to the mainstream (I wish to thank Gerald torres for this point).

43
Americans, thus making it complicated for the law to differentiate them from their
white hegemonic counterpart: the easier it is for the law to identify the group, the
easier it is for the law to discriminate against that group.159 Moreover, adopting highly
contextual group definitions might go against the hegemony’s interest in making clear
legal distinctions between itself and its "other" as a means of justifying the
discrimination against this "other".160 This inherent difficulty of applying de jure
discriminate against fairly similar groups led to a false belief -- produced by the legal
system -- that no discrimination occurred against these groups. Instead, although they
enjoyed formal equality, Mexican-Americans suffered from substantial de facto
discrimination. This arrangement caused their "non-clusion" when they were barred
from participating in the eventual remedial stage.
Mexican-Americans thus cross into the rights discourse from a unique
position. The discrimination discourse's rhetorical adherence to the differencesameness dichotomy guaranteed legal and social inclusion and entitlement for equal
rights only to "similar" people.161 This dichotomy relies on the concept of unity,
which prevents a discussion from developing about discrimination that imposes
different outcomes among sub-groups of supposedly “similar” people.162 MexicanAmericans share an illusory "sameness" with the hegemony; specifically, they share
the fact that they are different from the ultimate defined African-American "other"
and they are not subject to de jure discrimination. The myth of these commonalities
between Mexican-Americans and the American white hegemony was so deeply
rooted that it prevented Mexican-Americans from being identified as a distinct

159

Moreover, the Court denied attempts to complicate those categorizations, even when the "new
category" contained an intersection of two former familiar bases, such as race and gender. See
Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in The Politics
of Law – A Progressive Critique 195 (Ed: David Kairys, 1990) (criticizing the court's dismissal of a
black woman's petition for damages based on being sexually harassed, both on the basis of race and
gender).
160
De jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, for example, would have risked blurring the
white/black distinction, which was invaluable to whites. See George A. Martinez, Mexican Americans
and Whiteness, 2 Harv.-Latino L. Rev. 321 (1997).
161
Martha Minow describes this as the failure of rights analysis to escape the dilemma of difference.
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law 147 (1990).
162
This Article has borrowed this idea from the analysis of the non-Israeli-Palestinians as located
outside a frame of belonging to the Zionist vision. Outside the frame is how they were situated, not as a
"missing part" needed to be reconstructed into the frame of Israeli society, but rather as the "differend",
where the parties involved are presumed to have no common share of norms or ground on which their
conflict can be adjudicated. Raef Zreik, Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse, Jour. of
Palestine Stud. 133 (2004).

44
discriminated-against group that could have some legal relevance within the
antidiscrimination discourse.
Part V: Conclusion
Nothing in this Article should be read as favoring discrimination; instead, the
goal of this Article is to take a more nuanced approach to the effects of different
forms of discrimination on the legal recognition of different groups. Being a legally
cognizable

group

might

indeed

prove

insufficient

for

preventing

racial

discrimination,163 but nevertheless this Article argues that the law is capable of
improving the overall well being of a group. De facto discriminated-against groups
have not suffered the same wrongs that de jure discriminated-against groups have
suffered; nevertheless, a group's status as being de facto discriminated-against is very
important for determining a group's position. This importance is particularly salient in
the remedial stage; since the entitlement to legal relief is affected by the existence of
de jure discrimination and groups that suffer primarily from de facto discrimination
are unable to take advantage of these remedial mechanisms. This Article has tried to
illuminate the phenomenology through which these groups have generated their
identities and have followed different paths in the remedial legal system based on the
different forms of discrimination they suffered.
While the legal system’s abstention from the use of overt discrimination
against a group may be interpreted as an actual lack of discrimination, it can be also
seen as a form of appropriating the realm of discrimination, hence facilitating
exclusion rather than producing inclusion of the group. In determining the scope of
the eligibility of a de facto discriminated group for antidiscrimination relief, courts
should keep in mind the fact that the position of de facto discriminated-against groups
is a case study on the foolishness of the belief that what we see in the law is all that
exists.
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